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PRESUMPTION OF DEPENDENCE IN WORKERS'
COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS AS A DENIAL
OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Workers' compensation laws have widespread application to employment
relationships in the United States, covering 84.4 percent of the labor force.'
One objective of these compensation statutes is to provide funds to support
the families of workers killed on the job. 2 Each year employment results in
an estimated 11,000 to 14,000 fatalities; 3 while women workers comprise
37 percent of the labor force, 4 the vast majority of workers killed on the
job are men.5 Nevertheless, a significant number of women die from com-
pensable employment-related accidents each year. 6 Often, death benefits
provided for the family of a female employee are lower than benefits
provided for the similarly situated family of a male employee.
1 Skolnik & Price, Workmen's Compensation Under Scrutiny, 37 SOCIAL SECURITY
BULL. No. 10, at 5 (1974) (1969 data projected to 1972). See also BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1974, at 336 (1974) (1972 figures) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1974].
2 W. MALONE, M. PLANT & J. LITTLE, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 422 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as W. MALONE].
3 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1830, OCCUPA-
TIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES BY INDUSTRY, 1972 at 3, 13 (1974); U.S. NAT'L
COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION 3 (1973). Exact statistics are not yet available. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the National Safety Council estimates differ by 3000 deaths.
4 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1974, supra note 1, at 336.
5 See statistics cited in note 6 infra. Very roughly, about 95 percent of fatalities in-
volve men.
6 The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not break down its statistics by sex, nor are
there any recently published national studies of work-related fatalities broken down
by sex. Telephone interview with John T. Inzana, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 1975. However, HEW studies of fatalities broken down
by sex and place of accident show the following: (1) industrial places and premises-
2080 males, 62 females; (2) mine and quarry-354 males, 8 females; and (3) farm
(excluding farm home and home premises)-1649 males, 146 females. 2 U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1970,
pt. A, at 4-32, 4-33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as VITAL STATISTICS]. Another suggestive
figure is "accidents mainly of an industrial type"- 5 430 males, 538 females. VITAL
STATISTICS, supra, at 1-256.
Statistics from individual states also shed light on the breakdown by sex. California
work-related fatalities for the period 1968 to 1973 involved 4190 males and 121
females. DIVISION OF LABOR STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS, CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE AND SERVICES AGENCY, CALIFORNIA WORK IN-
JURIES 1973, at 65 (1974); CALIFORNIA WORK INJURIES 1972, at 65 (1973); CALIFORNIA
WORK INJURIES 1971, at 69 (1972); CALIFORNIA WORK INJURIES 1969, at 44 (1970);
Letter from Ms. Karen Jones, California Division of Labor Statistics and Research to
author, Aug. 29, 1975, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form. In Michigan from 1970 to 1973, 1055 males and 28 females became work-
related fatalities. Letter from Albert L. Osborn, Michigan Department of Labor,
Bureau of Safety and Regulation to author, Sept. 9, 1975, on file with the University
Workers' Compensation Death Benefits
This note will examine the sex bias prevalent in many workers' compen-
sation statutes and the constitutionality of these statutes in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions on sex discrimination. After this examination,
alternative methods for effecting reform of the sex-biased death benefit
provisions will be analyzed.
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS
A. The Overall View
The right of the survivors of a worker killed in a work-related accident
to receive death benefits is conferred exclusively by statute; the award does
not arise from a common-law survival or wrongful death action. 7 The
amount of the award under the typical statute depends on two factors.
First, the award varies as a percentage of the average weekly wage of the
employee. s Secondly, statutes frequently apportion benefits according to
the dependence of the claimants on the deceased employee by dividing
claimants into three groups: (1) those who recover solely on the strength
of their relationship to the decedent; (2) those who recover only if they can
prove proper relationship and then only to the extent they can show actual
dependency on the employee; and (3) those who cannot recover under any
circumstances even if dependent in fact." In some jurisdictions the husband
of a deceased female worker must qualify as a claimant in group (2) while
the wife of a deceased male employee falls into group (1) on the basis of a
conclusive presumption of dependency.
Nearly all jurisdictions grant benefits to the widow of a deceased
employee if she was living with the worker at the time of his death,10 con-
clusively presuming her to be dependent on her deceased husband. Of
fifty-four statutes, which represent the laws of the fifty states and Puerto
Rico as well as several federal benefit provisions, twenty-nine are sex-
neutral and grant similarly situated widowers identical benefits by applying
a conclusive presumption of dependence to both sexes when such a pre-
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. New York State does not compile statistics
by sex, but an unpublished study has revealed that during the years 1971 and 1972
the deaths of 1523 males and 57 females resulted in compensated claims under the
workers' compensation program. Telephone interview with Rita Israel, New York
State Department of Labor, Division of Research and Statistics, New York City,
Aug. 29, 1975. In Pennsylvania the number of work-related fatalities in 1974 was
388 male and 17 female. Letter from Raymond P. Steckler, Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Occupational Injury and Disease Compens-
sation, Data Input Section to author, Aug. 28, 1975, on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
7 Survival and wrongful death actions are barred when a workers' compensation
statute is applicable. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 64.10 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as A. LARSON].
8 Id. § 64.20, app. B, table 15.
9Id. § 62.10.
10See notes 11, 12 infra. This grant is based on the legislative assumption that
women are dependent on their husbands' income.
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sumption is used.'1 The remaining twenty-five statutes are sex-biased: while
a widow enjoys a presumption of dependence, a widower must prove de-
pendency in fact, or, under some statutes, both actual dependence and
incapacity to work. 12 The states with the sex-biased laws include most of
the heavily populated states and provide 62 percent of all workers'
compensation benefits. 13
11 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8101(11), 8133 (Supp. 1975) (Federal Employees' Compensation
Act); ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 280 (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.215 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1046 (Supp.. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-306 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2330 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.16 (Supp. 1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-42 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.7 (West's 1975 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 2 at 92); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 85.42 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508 (Cum. Supp. 1974); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 342.075 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 2 (Supp. 1974); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 101, § 36 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 32 (1965);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 92-413 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-124 (1974);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.615 (1973); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 281:2(IX) (Supp. 1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-12.10 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-39 (1972); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 656.204 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-33-13 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 72-161 (1962); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 65.1-66 (Cum. Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.050 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.51 (1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-342 (Supp. 1975).
Under the statutes of Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode Island widowers who were
living with their spouses enjoy the same basic presumption of dependency as widows.
As a secondary presumption, widows are considered to be dependent if they were
living apart from their husbands for justifiable cause or if they had been deserted.
Widowers do not enjoy this secondary presumption.
12 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 902, 922 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975) (Black Lung Bene-
fits Act of 1972); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 902, 909 (Supp. 1975); (Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers' Act); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1302(m), 81-1315(c) (1960); CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 3501 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-50-101 (1973); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 114-414 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 72-410 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-3-3-19 (Burns
1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1251 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.331
(Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.111 (Supp. 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-25
(Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.240 (Vernon Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-13 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 16 (McKinney 1965), as
amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-17 (Supp. 1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.59 (Page 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 48 (1970); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1975); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 3(5) (Cum. Supp.
1974); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 62-4-12 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1013
(Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-71 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 634
(1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-10 (Supp. 1974). The Puerto Rico statute and
the Black Lung Benefits Act make no provision for widowers. The Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers' Act was recently amended and no longer requires widow-
ers to prove dependence in fact. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576,
§§ 10(b), 20(c)(1), (2), 86 Stat. 1265. But since the benefit in the amount of 50 per-
cent of wages is to continue only during "dependent widowerhood" (33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 902(16), 909(b) (Supp. 1975)), the statute remains biased against husbands.
13 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1974, supra note 1, at 296. Of the eight largest states in
terms of both number of employees covered and amount of compensation benefits
paid (California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Texas, id. at 296, 346), only Illinois and Texas provide sex-neutral treatment
for the surviving spouse. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.7 (West's 1975 IIl. Legis.
Serv. No. 2 at 92); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974). The remaining
six states account for 47.3 percent of the total compensation paid by all states and
38.9 percent of the total industrial employment. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1974, supra
note 1, at 296, 346.
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B. Sex-Biased Presumptions of Dependency
in Six Major States
In Michigan, New Jersey, California, New York, and Ohio, the widow
of a deceased male employee is presumed to have been dependent on her
husband and is automatically entitled to full death benefits if she was living
with him at the time of his death, while the widower must prove at least
some degree of dependency on his wife to receive even partial benefits.' 4
In Michigan, for instance, a widower receives benefits commensurate with
those a widow receives in like circumstances only upon a showing that he
was "wholly dependent" upon the deceased employee. 15 If a widower is
unable to make this showing, the benefits to which he is entitled will be
lower than the benefits to which a similarly situated widow is entitled.
Consider, for example, a family consisting of husband, wife, and one child
under age sixteen. Young children, like widows, are conclusively presumed
to be wholly dependent.' 6 Therefore, if a female employee is survived by a
child under sixteen, her widower, as guardian, receives on behalf of the
child the award for a wholly dependent person.17 Even if the widower
receives the full award, on account of the minor child in the family, the
widower is disadvantaged as compared with a similarly situated widow in
two respects. First, the minimum and maximum awards' s are higher for
widow and child than for widower and child.' 9 Second, when the child
reaches age twenty-one, the benefits paid to the widower qua guardian
cease while benefits paid to a widow with a child continue for a period of
500 weeks from the date of the employee's death regardless of the child's
age. 20
If the deceased wife had no children, then the widower, to receive any
award, must show at least partial dependence. Even if he can demonstrate
partial dependence, compensation is not the full benefit which all widows
14CAL. LABOR CODE § 3501 (West 1971); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 418.331
(Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-13 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP.
LAW § 16 (McKinney 1965), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4123.59 (Page 1973).
15 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.331 (Supp. 1975).
16 Id.
17 Id. § 418.321. The award equals two-thirds of the wife's wages.
18 Although the standard measure for the death benefit award is two-thirds of the
wages of the deceased employee, the legislature has set maximum and minimum lim-
its to the weekly benefit payments. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 418.321 (Supp. 1975).
19 Id. The maxima and minima are periodically increased. MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 418.355 (Supp. 1975). The current figures are $107 and $70 for one de-
pendent and $112 and $73 for two dependents (a widow and a child for example).
BUREAU OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, MICHIGAN DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT OF 1969 AND RULES OF PRACTICE 101 (1975).
2 0 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 418.331, .335 (Supp. 1975). If the worker leaves
one relative partially dependent and another wholly dependent, the wholly dependent
person receives the entire benefit, and the partially dependent person cannot receive
any award until the death of the totally dependent person. Id. § 418.331. Therefore,
as the statute reads, when the child reaches age twenty-one, the partially dependent
widower qua guardian is cut off completely until the child dies. By contrast, the
widow qua guardian receives the full award, allocated half to her and half to the
child, and may continue to receive the full award after the child reaches twenty-one.
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receive, 21 but is only a fraction of the full benefit, the fraction equalling
the amount contributed by the wife to the husband for his support divided
by the annual earnings of the wife at her death.22 Moreover, while the wife
receives her full benefit automatically, the husband must present evidence
on income and expenses to prove dependency.23
Under the California statute, if the deceased female employee had a
partially dependent husband and one child, for example, the award is
$17,500, allocated to the child, in contrast to $20,000 for a widow and
child similarly situated. If there are no children, the partially dependent
widower receives an award equal to four times the annual amount of his
deceased wife's earnings allocated to his support, up to a maximum of
$15,000, while a widow similarly situated receives $17,500.24
The differential is even more striking in New York. If a deceased female
worker leaves a child and a husband who cannot show actual dependency,
the award is 30 percent of the decedent's wages, allocated solely to the
child, but a widow and child in identical circumstances receive 50 percent
of the deceased employee's wages. 25
Unlike the statutes discussed above, the Ohio workers' compensation
law allows the partially dependent widower to qualify for the same award
as the widow, who, conclusively presumed to be dependent, receives an
award in the amount of two-thirds of the deceased spouse's wages.26
However, the compensation commission has discretion to determine the
widower's dependency on an ad hoc basis and to apportion the benefits
between a child, who is conclusively presumed wholly dependent, and a
partially dependent husband.27 By means of a conclusive presumption of
total dependency, the widow avoids a hearing and a possibly unfavorable
ad hoc determination of the degree of her dependency.28
21 ld. § 418.331.
22 Id. § 418.321. How partial dependence is proven is especially confusing in the
case of a household of a husband and wife only. For the widower to receive any
benefits as a partially dependent claimant, he must demonstrate that his wife con-
tributed to his support, i.e., paid a portion of his share of the family expenses. If,
for example, the husband had an income of only $500 per year, while the wife's
income was $9500, and family expenses were a full $10,000, $5000 allocated to
each spouse, then the fraction for computing the partial benefit would be ($5000-
$500)/$9500, or 0.47. But if the husband had no earnings, he would receive 100
percent of the full benefit. The results are incongruous. Evidently, the statutory
provisions on partial dependency simply were not drafted to take care of the situa-
tion of a household with no children and both spouses working, yet it is precisely
this situation which breeds the greatest inequality in treatment between the sur-
viving male spouse and female spouse.
23 The New Jersey compensation statute is similar to Michigan's in its treatment
of partial dependents as well as in its conclusive presumption in favor of widows
and children. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-13 (Supp. 1975).
24 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3501, 3502, 4702, 4703 (West 1971).
25 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 16(1)(b), (2), (3) (McKinney 1965), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975). The widower must prove actual financial dependency if not
physical incapacity to work. See, e.g., Nagy v. Goldstein, 261 App. Div. 1030, 26
N.Y.S.2d 46 (1941).2 6 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.59(B), (C) (Page 1973).
27 Id. § 4123.59(D).
28 Id.
[VOL. 9:138
Workers' Compensation Death Benefits
To receive compensation in Pennsylvania, a widower must prove both
that he was dependent upon his wife for support and that he is incapable
of self-support. 29 Because of this requirement, a widow with a child receives
a benefit of 60 percent of the deceased's weekly wages, but a similarly
situated widower, unable to show both dependency and inability to support
himself, collects only the 32 percent of his spouse's wages to which the
child is presumptively entitled.30
The sex-biased statutes award unequal benefits to similarly situated men
and women solely on the grounds of sex. Female employees earn less in
terms of dollar benefits for their families than do similarly situated male
employees. In addition, widowers who qualify for some benefits face the
burden of proving partial dependency, total dependency, or, in some states,
incapability of self-support.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION: A BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Equal Protection
The analysis of discrimination cases through the Warren Court era pro-
ceeded under a "two-tier" approach. 31 The Court reviewed economic and
social welfare legislation under the lenient, four-point rational basis test
announced in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic.32 Under this first test, the
Court struck down a classification only if it was arbitrary and without any
reasonable basis. Under the second approach, the Court scrutinized statutes
strictly where a classification was suspect 33 or where a fundamental interest
was affected. 34 Under this stricter standard, the statute was upheld only if
29 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1975). Georgia, Idaho, and Vermont im-
pose similar restrictions on the survivors of deceased women employees. GA. CODE
ANN. § 114-414 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 72-410 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 634
(1959), as amended, (Supp. 1974). Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, and West Virginia
describe the requirement of incapability of self-support as physical incapability. ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1302(m), 81-1315(c) (1960); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1251 (1964);
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 287.240 (Vernon Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-10 (Supp.
1974).
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 561 (Supp. 1975).
31 See generally Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1972); Develop-
ments of the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
32 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). The four points were as follows: (1) States could
exercise wide discretion in classifications; classifications violated equal protection
only if they were without any reasonable basis and purely arbitrary. (2) Classifica-
tions with a reasonable basis were not offensive merely because some inequality
resulted in practice. (3) The Court would assume the existence of any state of facts
that could sustain the classification. (4) The person who challenged the classification
had the burden of showing that it was arbitrary and without any reasonable basis.
For more recent applications of the traditional test see McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) and Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
33 Held to be suspect classifications were: race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); alienage, Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and national origin, Oyama v. California, 322 U.S. 633
(1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
34 Fundamental interests include: voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); criminal appeals, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); travel,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the state could show a compelling interest which justified the classification.
Sex-based classifications were held to involve neither a fundamental interest
nor a suspect classification, thus falling under the four-point rational basis
test, and state laws which drew lines on the basis of sex were consistently
upheld.35
This two-tier approach was the generally accepted analysis at the time
the Illinois Supreme Court decided Holiday Inns of America v. Industrial
Commission.36 The court upheld the state's former workers' compensation
statute which automatically gave full benefits to widows, but which requited
a widower to show total dependency on his deceased spouse in order to
qualify for any award.3 7 Reversing the award of the lower court, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the statute by applying the lenient, four-point test,
which required only a rational relationship between the classification and
a possible legislative purpose. 38 The court explained that, although arguably
the legislature should have provided differently for widowers, it was not
for the judiciary to hold the statute unconstitutional on the grounds of this
deficiency. The legislature was not required to provide benefits to the de-
cedent's widower in every instance.3 9
B. The New Rational Basis Test
The lenient approach to sex discrimination continued until the Burger
Court decision in Reed v. Reed.40 There the Supreme Court enunciated a
new interpretation of the rational basis test, as applied to sex-based classifi-
cations, under which the Court looks more critically at legislative reasoning
and purpose. 41
35 See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Radice v. New
York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). For a thorough
critique of the sex discrimination decisions prior to 1971 see Johnston & Knapp,
Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675
(1971).
3648 Ill. 2d 528, 271 N.E.2d 884 (1971).
3 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.7(b) (1967). The statute has since been made
sex-neutral. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 138.7 (West's 1975 II1. Legis. Serv. No. 2 at
92).
38 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See note 32 supra.
39 48 I11. 2d at 532-33, 271 N.E.2d at 887. This former statutory provision was also
attacked in Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969).
In that case, after challenging the exclusive nature of the workers' compensation
remedy, the plaintiff husband secondarily challenged the benefit provision as a denial
of equal protection. Upholding the sex classification, the court reasoned that different
compensation to widows conformed to the economic situation present in American
society. Id. at 19, 253 N.E.2d at 375. For a brief discussion of the shortcomings of
the Duley holding see 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 1024 (1971).
40 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Johnston & Knapp, supra note 35, at 694-769.
41 See generally Gunther, supra note 31, at 18-20; Johnston, Sex Discrimination and
the Supreme Court 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 617 (1974); 7 CREIGHTON L. REV.
69, 75 (1973). The shift in the Court away from the lenient rational basis standard
has involved more than the area of sex discrimination. See Gunther, supra note 31,
at 18 n.88. This note concentrates only on the application of the new rational basis
test to sex discrimination cases.
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Reed arose when an adoptive mother and father each petitioned to be
appointed administrator of the estate of their deceased son. After a hearing
on the two petitions, the Idaho probate court appointed the father, relying
on an Idaho statute which required that male applicants be preferred.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, declaring the preference mandatory
and not subject to the discretion of the lower courts.42 On review the Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, identified the purpose of the
classification as administrative convenience: the preference eliminated the
need for a hearing and reduced the case load of the probate court. The
Court then examined whether the presumption in favor of males advanced
the purpose of the statute in a manner consistent with the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Citing a fifty-year-old decision, F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,43 the Court held that the classification had
no "fair and substantial relation" to the legislative purpose of finding a
competent administrator with a minimum of judicial effort. Because of the
sex-based classification, the statute did not treat persons in similar circum-
stances alike, namely, those equally competent to administer the estate of
a deceased person, and thereby contravened the equal protection clause. 44
Reed marked the first step toward a new examination of sex discrimina-
tion under the equal protection clause; the Court no longer accepts any
possible legislative purpose as a sufficient basis for upholding a statute,
but rather the Court ascertains the actual purpose or purposes and deter-
mines whether the classification is substantially related to that goal.
The statute in Reed denied a woman the opportunity to prove her com-
petency as an administrator; such a conclusive presumption against a sex
is clearly pernicious. Not until Frontiero v. Richardson 5 however, did the
Court examine the problem of a conclusive presumption in favor of a sex.
In that case, the challenged statute, which provided living quarters, allow-
ances, and medical benefits for the families of members of the uniformed
services, permitted a serviceman to claim his wife as a dependent for such
benefits without regard to dependency in fact, while a servicewoman could
obtain identical benefits only by proving that her husband in fact depended
on her for over one-half of his support.46 The statute resulted in two types
of discrimination: (1) procedural, in that the servicewoman had to prove
her spouse's dependence in fact while the serviceman did not; and (2) sub-
stantive, in that the servicewoman did not receive any benefits if her spouse
was not dependent in fact while the serviceman in like circumstances did. 4-
Upholding the statute against an equal protection challenge, the lower court
42 93 Idaho 511, 465 P.2d 635 (1970).
43 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
44 404 U.S. at 76, 77. Significantly, in Reed the Burger Court intruded into an area
of law, decedents' estates, which the Court usually chooses to avoid in deference to
state court determinations. Gunther, supra note 31, at 32-33.
45 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See generally Note, Sex Discrimination by Federal Govern-
bent in Payment of Fringe Benefits to Armed Service Personnel, 87 HARV. L. REV.
116 (1973).
46 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970); 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (1970).
47 411 U.S. at 680. Mr. Frontiero was not dependent on his wife for over half of
his support. 411 U.S. at 680 n.4.
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found the purpose of the sex-based classification to be administrative
convenience; since 99 percent of the uniformed services personnel were
males, and since most working men, even those with working wives, made
more than their wives, the presumption that wives of servicemen rely on
their husbands for more than one-half of their support resulted in consider-
able savings of administrative expense. 48
The Court reversed, holding that the statute denied women equal pro-
tection of the law. Justice Brennan, in a four-Justice plurality opinion,
departed from the traditional treatment of sex discrimination by declaring
sex a suspect classification subject to strict judicial scrutiny.49 The plurality
determined that the sole purpose of the statutes was administrative
convenience; the provisions did not have a remedial goal of rectifying the
past economic and employment discrimination against women. On the con-
trary, the statutes actually discriminated against women in uniform by
depriving them of benefits accorded to men.50 If the sole legislative purpose
is administrative convenience, Justice Brennan stated, then the burden is
on the government to demonstrate that it is less expensive to grant benefits
to the wives of all servicemen than to determine which wives were actually
dependent.51 The government failed to present evidence on administrative
costs; moreover, the plaintiff's evidence indicated that many wives would
fail to qualify as dependents if the one-half support test were applied to
them.52 Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded, such a distinction based
upon sex was an arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.53
The opinion left open the possibility that the government could have a
"compelling interest" in administrative convenience if it could show that
the classification actually furthered efficiency in operation. Classifications
by sex were not flatly prohibited.
Justice Stewart concurred in the plurality's result on the ground that
48 411 U.S. at 681-82. The government argued that Congress could properly make
such a classification for administrative convenience based on assumptions of the
dependence of wives on husbands and the lack of dependence of husbands on wives.
Brief for Appellee at 8, 9.
49 411 U.S. at 686. The plurality reasoned that, like race, sex is an immutable
characteristic, and any classification based on sex should be strictly scrutinized.
Society's increased sensitivity to sex as a classification is reflected in Congress'
enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, and
the Equal Rights Amendment.
50411 U.S. at 688, 689 n.22. See also Brief for Appellant at 11.
51 411 U.S. at 689. This may be essentially an argument of overbreadth, i.e.,
classifying wives as automatically dependent includes in that category wives who in
fact are not dependent on their husbands for support. See 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 69,
77 (1973).
52411 U.S. at 689 n.23. Brief for Appellant at 45 n.55.
53 411 U.S. at 690. The government had argued that, in contrast to Reed, the
classification at issue in Frontiero was not arbitrary but rather was "based upon
reasonable presumptions of dependency, which are in accord with the realities of
American life." Brief for Appellee at 10. Further, the government asserted that,
even if the stereotype of the housewife was no longer in conformity with reality, any
change in reality was solely for legislative consideration and not a reason for
judicial action. Brief for Appellee at 12.
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the statute engendered invidious discrimination.5 4 In a separate opinion,
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Burger also concurred in the result, but
relied solely on the analysis articulated in Reed.55 Since the classification
at issue had no "fair and substantial relation" to the legislative purpose, 56
the statute was invalid under the Reed test. All told, a majority of the Jus-
tices deciding Frontiero, unwilling to declare sex a suspect classification,
used the new rationality test to strike down a presumption which, for the
sake of administrative convenience, favored one sex.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 57 the Court applied the Reed-Frontiero
rational basis test to classifications in social security legislation. In Wiesen-
feld a widower attacked a social security provision which conferred a
"mother's insurance benefit" on the widow of an insured male who died
leaving a minor child, but which failed to grant a similar father's insurance
benefit to a widower.58 The Court held that the classification was indis-
tinguishable from the classification at issue in Frontiero.59 The generaliza-
tion that men are more likely than women to be primary family supporters,
the Court reasoned, could not justify treating men and women differently. 60
As a result of the statute, women failed to receive protection for their
families commensurate with the benefits accorded the families of insured
males, who had made equal contributions in the form of social security
premiums.6 ' The purpose of the statute was not remedial; it was not
designed to compensate widows for economic discrimination against
women.62 Rather, the statutory purpose was to enable the surviving parent
54 411 U.S. at 691. Apparently, Justice Stewart equates an invidious discrimination
test with a rational basis test. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486, reh.
denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); 7 CREIGHTON L. REv. 69, 82-83 (1973). Therefore,
Justice Stewart essentially determined the sex classification to be invalid under a new
rational basis test articulated in Reed.
5a 411 U.S. at 692. Unwilling to declare sex a suspect classification, the Justices
felt that the Court should defer any judicial resolution until the state legislatures
had acted on the Equal Rights Amendment. See text accompanying notes 155-56
infra.
56 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See notes 43-44 and accompanying text
supra.
57420 U.S. 636 (1975).
58 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(g) (1974).
59 420 U.S. at 642-43. Actually, the classification was distinguishable from that
in Frontiero. In this case the statute provided no benefits for the husband. By con-
trast, the statute at issue in Frontiero provided that a husband could obtain a
benefit if he were dependent on his wife for over one-half of his support. Compare
42 U.S.C.A. § 4 02(g) (1974) with Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-649, § 401,
76 Stat. 469. The Court noted this difference later in its opinion. 420 U.S. at 645.
60 420 U.S. at 645.
61 For the computation of social security benefits see 42 U.S.C.A. § 415 (1974).
62 Discussion of the statute as it affects women as insured wage earners rather
than as widow-beneficiaries reflects a fundamental difference in perceiving discrimina-
tion. Which side of the coin does one view-the compensation side or the benefit
side? The government focused on the economic plight of widows as beneficiaries in
order to find a remedial purpose of the legislation to favor women (Brief for Ap-
pellant at 11-15), and argued against the view of the statute as discriminating against
women in compensation by insurance fringe benefits. Brief for Appellants at 20, 22.
The government presented this remedial purpose argument in order to come within
the ambit of Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See notes 111-12 and accom-
panying text intra.
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to care for the child personally rather than to work and pay for child care. 63
The statute consequently sustained economic discrimination by providing
dissimilar treatment for men and women similarly situated.64
Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld portend a change in the test under
which the Court scrutinizes equal protection challenges in sex discrimination
cases.6 5 Under the new test the Court first identifies the purpose of the
challenged legislation 6 by examining the statutory scheme and legislative
history.6 7 It next determines whether there is a rational connection between
the classification and purpose of the statute.6 8 If classification by sex is used
as a shortcut for administrative convenience purposes, it cannot be predi-
cated on outmoded generalizations about sex roles.69 The burden is on the
government to show both the purpose of the statute and the rational rela-
tionship between the classification and the purpose. 70 These recent cases
mark a departure from a two-tier analysis and the beginning of a new
intermediate ground of scrutiny for sex-based statutory classifications. 71
63 420 U.S. at 648-49. The Court refused to accept the government's argument
that the legislative intent was to aid widoWs. See Brief for Appellant at 13-14.
64 420 U.S. at 653. Justice Powell, concurring in the result, emphasized the factor
of discrimination against women as wage earners. Id. at 654.
65 Still another mode of equal protection analysis, which weighs competing public
policies outright without delving into identification of purpose or examining rational
relationships, appears in Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protec-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). This note discusses only the new rational basis an-
alysis because, while the above-cited note makes the substantial claim that courts
actually use a policy analysis when deciding cases, no court has yet advanced that
approach in a written opinion.
66 For example, in Reed and Frontiero the purpose of the statute was found to
be solely administrative convenience; in Wiesenfeld it was to permit child care by
the surviving spouse. See notes 42-63 and accompanying text supra.
The purpose advanced to justify the classification need not be the primary pur-
pose of the statute. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). For example, if the
primary purpose is administrative convenience, but the government successfully
proves an ancillary purpose to justify the discrimination, then the classification can
withstand equal protection scrutiny.
67 See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
68 In Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973), a woman was denied
employment as a page in the South Carolina State Senate on the basis of her sex.
The state wanted to avoid any appearance of impropriety in its legislature and, there-
fore, prescribed the hiring of female pages. The court held that there was no "fair
and substantial relation" between the basis of the classification (sex) an the object
of the classification (avoiding impropriety).
69 In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), for example, a Utah statute extended
the majority age for males to twenty-one while keeping the age for females at
eighteen. As a result, a divorced father cut off payments for his daughter at age
eighteen. The Utah court upheld the statute as being founded on "old notions" that
(1) boys had to be educated to become providers, and (2) girls tend to mature phys-
ically and emotionally before boys. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that under
any test the criterion of sex of the child was wholly unrelated to the objective of
the statute (child support), since women were no longer destined to become
housewives.
70Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975) (identification of pur-
pose); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (connection between
classification and purpose).
71 Gunther, supra note 31, at 8. Future challenges are not likely to have the ad-
vantage of a view of sex as a suspect classification. The present Court has shown a
reluctance to scrutinize new areas strictly, and changes in Court personnel are not
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C. Holiday Inns Reconsidered Under the
New Rational Basis Test
In view of the changes in analysis of sex discrimination cases, it is likely
that a state court, if given the opportunity to consider the facts in Holiday
Inns7 2 would view the presumption of dependence differently today.73
Courts no longer routinely approve lines drawn according to sex;7 4 con-
trary to the statement in the Illinois opinion, 75 the burden is now on the
government to show that the classification rests on a reasonable basis. 70
Moreover, a court must now examine the facts presented and can no longer
assume a state of facts sufficient to sustain the legislation.77 The four years
since Holiday Inns have witnessed major changes in judicial review of sex-
based classifications; death benefits legislation can no longer rely on
Holiday Inns as a certain precedent for judicial approval.
IlI. THE NEW RATIONAL BASIS TEST AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS
A. Purpose of Death Benefits
Underlying workers' compensation is the theory that, since employment-
related injuries are inevitable, the price of a product or service should
likely to bolster the plurality bloc in the Frontiero case. See Gunther, supra note 31,
at 12-15; 59 IOWA L. REV. 377, 382 nn.58 & 59 (1973); Note, Sex Discrimination and
Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1499, 1506-16 (1971). Nor are future cases likely to return to the discredited sub-
stantive due process analysis, under which the Court freely scrutinized legislative
purposes; the Court will limit its examination to the means of the legislation. See
Gunther, supra note 31, at 43-44.
72 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
73 Although the Illinois legislature has recently amended the state compensation
statute to overcome the holding in Holiday Inns, that decision still represents the
traditional judicial determination of the issue of sex discrimination in compensation
death benefits.
74 Many of the precedents cited by the Illinois court are now without force; a
few were invalid at the time of the decision. For example, Gruenwald v. Gardner,
390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968), has been undermined by
congressional action. 42 U.S.C.A. § 415(b)(3) (1974) (the retirement age for both
men and women is now sixty-two). Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), is ineffective
after the jury-selection decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The
frequently cited case upholding the Michigan law which prohibited barmaids from
soliciting drinks, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), has been thoroughly
discredited in several decisions. See, e.g., White v. Fleming, 44 U.S.L.W. 2052 (7th
Cir. July 24, 1975); Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The
Indiana rule which allowed a wife no cause of action for loss of consortium upheld
in Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1066 (1969), was changed prior to Holiday Inns. England v. Dana Corp.,
428 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1970); Troue v. Marker, 252 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969). Finally,
the Illinois court failed to mention a state equal rights amendment which had passed
by referendum six months before the decision. See note 155 and accompanying text
infra.
75 Holiday Inns of America v. Indus. Comm'n, 48 Ill. 2d 528, 532-33, 271 N.E.2d
884, 887 (1971).
76 See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
7 48 I11. 2d at 532-33, 271 N.E.2d at 887.
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reflect the cost of injury or death to the workers just as it bears the cost of
breakage to the machinery. 78 Workers' compensation differs from social
security in that covered employees contribute no part of the cost of the
program; the entire cost is borne by the employer as a business expense
and, in theory, passed on to the consumer through the price of the prod-
uct.7 9 Therefore, workers' compensation is not amenable to the argument
made in social security cases that since all employees pay the same
premium, all should receive the same benefits regardless of sex.8 0
Nor are compensation awards like benefits received from private pension
plans; they are not fringe benefits because individual employers cannot be
compelled through collective bargaining to add to hourly wages the amount
equivalent to the benefits.8 1 Most private employer pension plans are sub-
ject to the strict prohibition against sex discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,82 a completely separate standard from four-
teenth amendment equal protection. 83 While reference to the congressional
mandate forbidding sex discrimination may have the residual effect of per-
suading judges to rethink their traditional positions on the equal protection
argument,8 4 Title VII does not apply directly to workers' compensation
programs.
Rather, compensation benefits are a type of income insurance, a weekly
stipend to replace wages lost from the accident.8 5 The level of benefits, set
by statute, usually varies with the wages of the covered employee and the
number of beneficiaries.86 Thus the system falls somewhere between a strict
78 W. MALONE, supra note 2, at 47; Honnold, The Theory of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 3 CORNELL L. REV. 264, 268 (1918).
79 Id.
80 The argument that women are being deprived of paid-for benefits for their
families, a factor in Wiesenfeld, became a recurring theme in later social security
decisions. See Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975); Gold-
farb v. Secretary of HEW, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
81 1 A. LARSON, BASIC CONCEPTS & OBJECTIVES OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION LAWS, 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CONCEPTS & OBJECTIVES].
82 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(e)-2 (1974) (an employer may not discriminate on the basis
of sex in compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment); 29 C.F.R. §
1604.9(d) (1974) (an employer may not provide fringe benefits for the wife and
family of a male employee without providing the same benefits for the husband
and family of a female employee). See also Decision of EEOC No. 70-513, Case No.
AT 7-3 244, CCH EEOC DECISIONS (1973) para. 6114 (Feb. 4, 1970).
83 Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 2013 (4th Cir. June 27, 1975). Com-
pare Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d
1024 (2d Cir. 1975) and Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1975) with Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (pregnancy-related disability
payments). Compare Rosen v. Publ. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973)
with Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982
(1968) (different retirement ages for men and women).
84 See Johnston & Knapp, supra note 35, at 675, 701. This type of argument was
made in Brief for Appellee at 38 et seq., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975).
85 1 A. LARSON, supra note 7, §§ 2.20, 3.30, 3.40; W. MALONE, supra note 2, at 82;
CONCEPTS & OBJECTIVES, supra note 81, at 31, 32, 34.
86A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 3.30. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.321
(Supp. 1975).
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replacement for a tort recovery and a form of social insurance: it generally
compensates for job-related accidents as a tort action does by varying the
award with the earning power of the deceased employee, but it adjusts the
level of compensation to the size of the employee's family as would a
welfare scheme.
B. Death Benefits Presumption of
Dependency
Under virtually all compensation statutes, the widower has at least some
opportunity to qualify for benefits by showing dependency in fact or both
dependency and incapacity for self-support.8 7 If the statute gives one sex
no means of proving dependency, then there is at work a conclusive pre-
sumption against that sex.88 The legislation challenged in both Reed and
Wiesenfeld bore elements of this conclusive negative presumption. The
Idaho statute in Reed gave preference to a male applicant without granting
the female applicant a hearing.8 9 The social security provisions challenged
in Wiesenfeld provided no father's insurance benefit, thus denying fathers
the chance to prove child care needs similar to those of mothers. 90
The conclusive presumption of dependency in workers' compensation is
a positive presumption in favor of one sex, like that in Frontiero.91 Since
Frontiero the presumption in favor of one sex has been struck down in two
federal district court cases involving social security.92 There is no indica-
87 Two exceptions are the Puerto Rico compensation law and the federal Black
Lung Benefits Act, neither of which make any provision for widowers. 30 U.S.C.A.
§§ 902, 922(a)(2); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 3(5) (Supp. 1974).
88 In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). for example, under the statute at
issue an unwed father had no opportunity to establish his fitness as a parent to gain
custody of his child, but an unwed mother enjoyed a presumption of fitness.
89 See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
90 See notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra. Another social security case in
which a similar distinction existed is Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). Un-
der the statutory provision challenged there, illegitimate children who were not
acknowledged until after the onset of the father's disability were denied benefits.
The Court held that the blanket exclusion of these illegitimates was not reasonably
related to the purported purpose of preventing spurious claims. 417 U.S. at 636. In a
workers' compensation case, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), the Court struck down a Louisiana provision which relegated unacknowledged,
illegitimate children of a deceased employee to a lower priority of right to benefits
than legitimate children without allowing illegitimate children to prove economic
loss as a result of the death. See also Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
41 Ohio St. 2d 120, 322 N.E.2d 880 (1975).
91 See notes 46, 47 and accompanying text supra. See also 59 IOWA L. REV. 377,
384 (1973).
92 In Goldfarb v. Secretary of HEW, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), a dis-
trict court ruled that the widower's benefit provisions (42 U.S.C.A. § 402(f) (1974)),
which required a widower to prove that he was receiving over one-half of his support
from his wife, discriminated unconstitutionally on the basis of sex, since widows did
not have to prove any support from their husbands to qualify for the analogous
widow's insurance benefit, 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(e) (1974). One month later a three-
judge district court in Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975),
for similar reasons, struck down the requirement that a husband prove he was
receiving over one-half of his support from his wife to qualify for the husband's
insurance benefit. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(c)(1) (1974) with 42 U.S.C.A. §
402(b)(1) (1974).
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tion that a statute which employs only a presumption in favor of one sex
and allows the other sex to qualify by showing actual need is any more
likely to be upheld than a statute which employs a conclusive presumption
against one sex. Both types of presumptions result in a denial of equal
protection.93
C. Identification of Purpose
Identifying the specific purpose or purposes of a statute is crucial to any
equal protection analysis. 94 While the purpose which the government
proffers in justifying a classification need not have been the legislature's
primary purpose in enacting the statute, but may have been an ancillary
motive, 95 a mere recitation of possible purposes by the government is not
sufficient. 96 The burden of identifying a purpose is on the govemment,
97
and courts have been willing to reject a profferred purpose as being unlikely
or impossible.98 The following discussion examines various purposes which
may be advanced to justify presumptions of dependency in workers' com-
pensation.
1. Administrative Convenience-If the purpose of death benefits is to
provide for persons economically dependent on the deceased employee, 99
the most obvious purpose behind a classification based on sex and a
conclusive presumption in favor of widows is administrative convenience.
The presumption is a shortcut way to determine which persons were
actually dependent on the deceased. The presumption is based on an as-
sumption that typically husbands are family providers and wives are full-
time homemakers. 100 The sex-based classification employed in the com-
pensation statutes is in many respects like the classification at issue in
93 The effect of the difference is one of degree only. One results in an absolute ex-
clusion of one sex; the other results in both procedural burdens on, and substantive
discrimination against, one sex.
94 See, e.g., Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 376 F. Supp. 473 (D.R.I. 1974)
(purpose of ban against girls on little league was safety in a "contact" sport); Norton
v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973) (purpose of social security child's
insurance benefit was to compensate for "loss of support" rather than the "loss of
right to support"); M. v. M., 321 A.2d 115 (Del. 1974) (basis for classification was
the "fundamental concepts of family life" in addition to administrative convenience).
CI. Brief for Appellant at 55 & n.56, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
95 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973).
9 6 Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975).
97 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 & n.16 (1975); Jablon v. Secretary
of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118, 129 (D. Md. 1975) (the government did not refer the
court to any legislative history on the remedial purpose of the statute).
98 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-44 (1975). See Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
99 See W. MALONE, supra note 2, at 422.
103See, e.g., Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973), involving a
Rhode Island unemployment compensation statute which automatically gave an un-
employed male an additional $5 per month per child, but which required an unem-
ployed woman to demonstrate that her child was totally dependent upon her for
support. Striking down the statute as a violation of equal protection, the court
found that the legislative recognition that in most cases the father is the main sup-
port for minor children was just a rephrasing of the concept of convenience. 361 F.
Supp. at 861.
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Frontiero,'0' and the impetus to make use of shortcuts is equally strong
in both the compensation statutes and the benefit provisions challenged in
Frontiero. Just as most service personnel are males, 10 2 and a provision to
eliminate a hearing for ascertaining their benefits greatly eases the
administration process, so the great majority of employment-related
fatalities involve men, 0 3 and any procedure which facilitates the automatic
resolution of the majority of compensation cases minimizes the costs of
disbursing benefits to the claimants. The relatively expensive hearing
process is then reserved for the minority of cases, which involve deceased
women, and the overall administrative costs of the program are minimal.' 0 4
2. Remedial Purpose-Another defense often advanced to justify sex-
based classifications is that the suspect legislation is remedial in purpose.
In Kahn v. Shevin,10 5 the Court upheld a Florida statute which granted a
property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers on the ground that
the purpose of the statute was to rectify past economic discrimination
against women by "cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the
sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."'1 6 The
Kahn argument has also been used successfully to uphold sex-based classi-
fications in the social security area. In Gruenwald v. Gardner,07 the
Second Circuit upheld the difference in retirement ages of sixty-five and
sixty-two for men and women respectively'0 8 on the ground that older
women face special job discrimination as compared with men similarly
situated. The possibility of having a remedial purpose, which was recog-
nized in Frontiero,10 9 may justify and legitimate an otherwise unconstitu-
tional classification."10
Whether a remedial purpose should be assigned to workers' compensa-
101 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
102 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1973).
103 See note 5 supra.
104 The statutory scheme of compensation laws also suggests a purpose of con-
venience. Presumptions of dependence in favor of children usually follow immedi-
ately the widow's presumption. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3501 (West 1971); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.331 (Supp. 1975). The placement of the two presumptions
together indicates that legislatures are assuming that the usual employee's immediate
family consists of a wife and children.
105 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
106416 U.S. at 355. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), the Court up-
held a statutory system for the automatic dismissal of U.S. Navy officers who had
not achieved promotion within a specified time which allowed female officers a
longer term of service without promotion than that allowed for male officers, be-
cause Congress may have believed that women have les3 opportunity for promotion
than men. An implicit alternative justification was that Congress has extensive
powers over the armed services for national security reasons.
107 390 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968). See also Polelle v.
Secretary of HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. I11. 1974); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F.
Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
108 Act of June 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 103(a), 75 Stat. 137. The provision
is now sex-neutral. 42 U.S.C.A. § 415(b)(3) (1974).
109 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.22 (1973).
110 In Frontiero the government conceded that the statute had no remedial pur-
pose; administrative convenience was the sole purpose of the classification. 411 U.S.
at 688 & n.22.
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tion depends on whether the award is viewed as analogous to a remunera-
tion to the employee or to a welfare payment to the beneficiaries."1 If one
takes the view that the working woman does not earn by her employment
as many benefits for her family as the working man earns, then the statute
does not remedy but actually adds to economic discrimination. If, however,
one takes the view that the legislation benefits widows more than widowers,
then it can be viewed as remedial, and as discriminating against men rather
than against women. 112 Because workers' compensation falls somewhere
between tort compensation for loss of earning power and social welfare," l3
either perspective can be taken. Since benefits increase with the number
of dependents surviving, there must be a limited social welfare function
behind the system. But the question to ask is whether this limited welfare
function justifies the classification by sex. The inclusion of the presumption
for widows together with a similar provision in favor of minor children 114
suggests that the true purpose is not to remedy economic discrimination
against women but rather to provide a shortcut to determine those persons
in the family of the deceased employee who are actually dependent on the
lost wages of the worker. 115 Nevertheless, both Kahn and Gruenwald con-
stitute strong precedents for the legitimacy of a remedial purpose for any
state which is able to identify that purpose behind the enactment of the
death benefits legislation, even if the primary motive for the presumption
is administrative convenience. 116
3. Protection of Fiscal Integrity of Finite Welfare Funds-Another
possible purpose for requiring factual proof of dependency of widowers is
to limit the scope of the compensation program and maintain the limited
funds available. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has deferred to the judg-
ment of the state legislatures in allocating finite welfare funds even if that
allocation has been based on broad classifications." l7 In Geduldig v.
Aiello,118 the Court upheld a provision of the California Unemployment
Disability Fund which was designed to compensate for wage loss due to
disability not covered by workers' compensation, but which specifically
1 See Brief for Appellant at 20-22, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975).
112 In an informal discussion with law students two years ago, Justice Stewart noted
that "the female of the species has the best of both worlds. She can attack laws that
unreasonably discriminate against her while preserving those that favor her." HARV.
L. SCHOOL RECORD, March 23, 1973, at 15, in Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal
Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A.J. 1013, 1017 (1973). See also 23 KANSAS L. REV. 534,
537 & n.27 (1975).
113 See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
114 See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3501 (West 1971); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 418.331 (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1975).
115 See note 104 supra.
116 See 23 KANSAS L. REV. 534, 543 (1975).
117 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (Texas, in computing
AFDC benefits, paid recipients a smaller percentage of the standard of need than
provided to other categories of beneficiaries); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
reh. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970) (Maryland statute set a maximum limit on the
amount of welfare which any family could receive regardless of family size).
118 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See generally Johnston, supra note 41, at 673-81.
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excluded disability associated with normal pregnancy. 119 The Court empha-
sized that the Fund was self-supporting, was designed to be financed by
a deliberately low rate of contribution of 1 percent of employees' salaries,
and could be placed in fiscal jeopardy if burdened with the increased
costs of pregnancy-related disability.120
Cost limitation has always been a purpose of workers' compensation
legislation because of the fear that any expansion of coverage will induce
businesses to leave the more costly jurisdictions.1 21 For example, opponents
of a proposed amendment to the New York compensation act to provide
for pregnancy disability have argued that the change would be too costly. 122
Compared with the federal social security program, which has enormous
resources, the state social welfare funds have enjoyed more leeway under
the Court's scrutiny. In Jiminez v. Weinberger,123 for example, the Court
reasoned that since the federal trust fund was better able to withstand
added costs than were state funds, a classification which excluded illegiti-
mates as a shortcut to detecting spurious claims was not justified as a
method of protecting the fund financially. Therefore, a sex-based classifica-
tion is more easily justified when it clearly appears that without the classifi-
cation a limited fund would be imperiled.
D. Connection Between Classification
and Purpose
Once the true purposes of the compensation statutes have been identified,
the state faces the burden of establishing a rational relationship between
statutory classifications and the legislative objectives of administrative con-
venience, remedy for discrimination, or cost limitation. 124
1. Administrative Convenience-If the purpose of the presumption is
administrative convenience in ascertaining deserving beneficiaries, the ques-
119 CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 2601 et seq. (West 1972), as am ended, (West Supp.
1975).
120 417 U.S. at 492-96.
121 See J. BURTON, INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN EMPLOYERS' COST OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION 75 (1966).
122 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1975, at 33, col. 3.
123 417 U.S. 628 (1974). See also Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118
(D. Md. 1975). This cost limitation purpose was also argued by the government in
Brief for Appellant at 22, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
124 Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp 1233,
1242 (D. Kan. 1974); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854, 861 (D.R.I. 1973) (bur-
den was on Rhode Island to show both administrative convenience and cost savings);
Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501, 506 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (burden
was on Board to show rational relationship between mandatory pregnancy-leave
regulations and the ends sought to be achieved); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities
Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258, 262 (D. Neb. 1972) (sex-based classification which pro-
hibited female student from playing on boys' golf team; burden was on the state to
show a rational relationship between the classification and the objective of financial
savings). Contra, State v. Duvall, 302 So. 2d 909, 911 (La. 1974) (challenge to
prostitution law). See also Note, supra note 45, at 122, 125. If whether a statute
uses a sex-based classification is at issue, then the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that the classification is in fact sex-based. Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295
(1st Cir. 1972); Bravo v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Il. 1972).
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tion becomes whether there is a "fair and substantial relation"' 25 between
the basis for the classification (sex) and the object of the classification
(convenience). Statements in lower court decisions following Frontiero
that administrative convenience alone is never a sufficient justification for
sex-based classifications are misleading. 126 In Frontiero, the government
failed to demonstrate that classification on the basis of sex furthered the
goal of administrative convenience by making the task of ascertaining de-
pendency easier and less expensive. If the cost of determining which widows
are actually dependent exceeds the cost of granting benefits to widows who
are not actually dependent, then a presumption based on sex in a compen-
sation statute may be justified. 27 In other words, if the classification results
in administrative efficiency, then it may be constitutional. The ultimate
purpose, administrative convenience, is itself legitimate, but to satisfy the
Reed-Frontiero test, the classification must bear a rational connection to
this purpose.
Perhaps a stronger case can be made in support of sex-based presump-
tions in compensation laws than for the classification employed in the
uniformed services benefits provisions found unconstitutional in Frontiero.
While the median income of male service personnel at the time of Frontiero
was only $3686, for civilian employees the median income for males was
$6670 in the same year. 128 Therefore, the assumption that the husband is
the principal wage earner is more likely to be true in the civilian setting
than in the military setting.1 29 Moreover, since the wife's income exceeds
the husband's in only 7.4 percent of all families, 130 a classification which
assumes that the husband is the provider appears prima facie rational,
especially where a civilian family is involved.
If a sex-based presumption is to be upheld as rationally connected to the
goal of administrative convenience, however, the state must prove more
than a statistical likelihood that husbands earn more income than wives;
it must also demonstrate that if widows were required to prove dependency
in the same manner as widowers, they would still qualify as dependents.13 '
If a substantial number of widows would not so qualify, then a presumption
which qualifies them automatically will result in the granting of benefits to
many claimants without justification. If the amount of these excess benefits
125 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Mont. 1975)
(holding Selective Service Act unconstitutional); United States v. Yingling, 368 F.
Supp. 379, 385 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (dictum) (holding Selective Service Act constitu-
tional); M. v. M., 321 A.2d 115 (Del. 1974) (dictum) (upholding statute which per-
mitted wife upon divorce to share in husband's property, but did not permit husband
to share in wife's property).
127 411 U.S. at 689. See Note, supra note 45, at 125. See also Bowen v. Hackett,
361 F. Supp. 854, 861 (D.R.I. 1973).
128 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1973, at 334 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
1973].
129 These figures are somewhat misleading because part of service compensation is
in the form of fringe benefits.
130 N.Y. Times, March 19, 1973, at 40, col. 1.
131 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.23 (1973).
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is greater than the cost of determining which widows qualify without a pre-
sumption, then the classification is not administratively efficient and is not
rationally related to the goal of administrative convenience.
In Michigan, for example, a wife would be required to prove dependency
in fact to qualify for even a partial award. 132 Only if she had no income
could she receive the full award which she currently receives as a result of
the presumption. But 42.2 percent of the total number of married women
with husbands present are in the labor force.'3 3 Therefore, in nearly one-
half of the cases, widows are receiving more benefits under the presumption
than they would if required to demonstrate actual dependency. Consequent-
ly, the cost of using the presumption is substantial. Similarly, in Pennsylva-
nia a widow would have to show incapacity for self-support.'3 4 Especially in
Pennsylvania, therefore, it would be difficult to prove the administrative
efficiency of the presumption, since few married women are invalids. Ac-
cordingly, if the sole purpose of the presumption is administrative
convenience, then under any of the above statutory schemes the classifica-
tion is probably not rationally related to that purpose. Furthermore, if the
number of women in the labor force continues to increase, these sex-biased
classifications will become less rational and more arbitrary and invidious.
2. Remedial Purpose-If a state can identify a remedial purpose in ad-
dition to the goal of administrative convenience, then courts, under the
rationale of Kahn v. Shevin, will require a fair and substantial relation to
the object of "cushioning of the financial impact of spousal loss upon
the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden." 135
The facts presented in Kahn concerning the economic standing of women
in the United States 136 would also apply to cases of fatalities under workers'
compensation acts. However, Kahn was a tax case with persuasive dissent-
ing opinions by Justices Brennan and White, and its holding might be
limited to the narrow area of public finance. 37
A different approach to the remedial purpose question was taken in
Polelle v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,138 where the district
court, upholding a social security provision which set different retirement
ages for men and women,139 required a direct and immediate relation
between the corrective factor and the known discrimination. Kahn, by
132 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.321 (Supp. 1975). For example, taking the
median incomes of men and women in the United States (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1973,
supra note 128, at 334), if the husband earns $6903 and the wife earns $2408, and
the wife's expenses are one-half of the total income, then the wife could receive a
benefit of only 32.6 percent of the full award.
133 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1974, supra note 1, at 341. Of these married women
with husbands present and children aged six to seventeen years, 50.1 precent work. Id.
134 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 562 (Supp. 1975).
135 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
136 416 U.S. at 353 nn.4 & 5.
137 See Johnston, supra note 41, at 661-72. Justice Douglas noted in his majority
opinion that states, when structuring systems of taxation, have "large leeway" to
make classificatons where no specific federal right, other than equal protection, is
jeopardized. 416 U.S. at 355.
138 386 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. I11. 1974).
139 Act of June 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 103(a), 75 Stat. 137.
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contrast, did not mandate that the remedy be so specifically focused on the
discriminating situation. 140 The Polelle court recognized that the "romantic
paternalism" which had characterized earlier decisions upholding the same
social security provision was, after Frontiero, insufficient to justify the dis-
crimination.' 4 ' In addition, the court interpreted a subsequent amendment
to the Social Security Act which made retirement ages the same for men
and women 142 as a congressional determination that women had worked
long enough under the Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
make further compensation for discrimination unnecessary.
143
Even if the argument that social welfare legislation should be treated
differently from tax law is accepted, the rational relationship between the
classification and the legislative objective is more difficult to refute once
the purpose is deemed to be remedial rather than solely administrative
convenience. While a sexually discriminatory legislative classification based
on administrative convenience assumes that men are providers and women
are homemakers, a clearly inaccurate proposition, a classification which
seeks to remedy economic disadvantages assumes only that working
women have been earning lower wages than men, a clearly more valid
proposition. 4 4
3. Protection of Fiscal Integrity of Finite Welfare Funds-If limiting
the costs of the program is a recognized purpose of sex-based classifications
in workers' compensation benefits, then an effort to refute a rational con-
nection faces the challenges based on Aiello.145 However, whereas inclusion
of pregnancy disability in the program at issue in Aiello would have in-
creased costs by between $120 million to $131 million, or 33 percent to 36
percent, 146 in workers' compensation both absolute and percentage cost
increases arising out of sex-neutral legislation would be minimal. 147 Aiello
is further distinguishable in that there is no specific policy of keeping indi-
vidual employee premiums low in the workers' compensation area since
the cost of the program is borne directly by the employer. Moreover, if an
industry employs women, and the dangers of production result in fatalities,
then that industry should not enjoy a windfall savings merely because of
the deceased employee's sex. If the price of the product is supposed to
reflect the cost of injury or death to the production workers, 148 then
widowers as a group should not have to bear part of the human costs of
production.
140416 U.S. 351 (1974).
141 386 F. Supp. at 445.
142 42 U.S.C.A. § 415(b)(3) (1974).
143 386 F. Supp. at 445.
144 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1973, supra note 128, at 334.
145417 U.S. 484 (1974).
146 417 U.S. at 494 n.18.
147 Death benefits account for less than 10 percent of all compensation benefits.
UNITED STATES NAT'L COMM'N ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 71(1972). Since women at present account for only a small percentage of total fatalities
(see note 5 supra), the cost of providing equal treatment to their survivors is only a
small fraction of 10 percent.
148 See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
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E. Balancing Governmental and Personal Interests
Any examination of the rationality of legislative means chosen to effect
a purpose inevitably weighs, overtly or implicitly, the governmental and
personal interests involved. 149 In some cases the individual imposition may
be so minimal that it does not justify barring a sex-based classification. 150
In other cases, though the personal interest is substantial, the governmental
interest is crucial. 151
The individual interest in collecting compensation benefits in the same
manner as others similarly situated and the governmental interest in pro-
viding, at a reasonable cost and as conveniently as possible, wage-loss
insurance for the victims of work-related accidents are both substantial.
Whenever a wife works, her income, whether large or small in relation to
that of her spouse, benefits her family economically; when the woman pro-
vider dies, the family is deprived of that income. If, as under the present
sex-biased compensation statutes, the family is unable to recoup her income,
then the wage loss is only partially insured, depending on the sex of the
employee. A state cannot, therefore, fully accomplish its underlying pur-
pose of providing wage-loss insurance under the present system of broad
and inaccurate classification by sex. At a time when few women worked,
the sex classification may have furthered the underlying state interest;
today, when many women are employed, the classification no longer ad-
vances the state interest effectively. 15 2 Although individual and state inter-
149 See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F.
Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974). See Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection:
Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1512 (1971).
15OSee, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace. 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afl'd, 405
U.S. 970 (1972) (married woman sought to use her maiden name rather than her
husband's surname on her driver's license application).
151 In United States v. Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1974), the govern-
mental interest in national security was deemed to be so urgent as to justify sex dis-
crimination in the Selective Service Act. "Just as different individual rights invoke
different judicial Tesponses, different governmental interests require diverse judicial
treatment.'? 373 F. Supp. at 1118. But see United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Mont. 1975) (Selective Service Act was unconstitutional because the government
did not show how national security would be affected if women were drafted).
In the extreme example of this balancing process, Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), the threat to national security justified the wholesale exclusion
of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast during wartime without regard to any
case-by-case determinations of loyalty to the United States.
152 Another indication that the classification is obsolete with regard to the state
policy is that today a wrongful death action is usually available upon the death of
either spouse. E.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 377 (West 1973); Burke v. City &
County of San Francisco, 11 Cal. App. 2d 314, 244 P.2d 708 (1952); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (Supp. 1975). Workers' compensation benefits are in lieu of
this tort action. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
Cataldo v. Admiral Inn.,.Inc., 102 R.I. 1, 227 A.2d 199 (1967) (upheld statutory
conclusive presumption of dependence in favor of widower on the grounds that the
award compensated for loss of a wrongful death action). The compensation statute
then becomes the exclusive remedy. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 7, §§ 65.10, 65.20, 66.30.
For examples of exclusivity provisions see CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601 (West Supp.
1975); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 418.131 (Supp. 1975). See, e.g., Duley v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969). The reason for the re-
placement was that the traditional tort remedies compensated inadequately for
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ests are to some extent opposed, in that full benefits to the families of the
deceased female employees will boost program costs, making compensation
provisions sex-neutral may actually further both interests by allowing the
state to realize fully its wage-loss insurance objective.
IV. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE TOWARD SEX-
NEUTRAL STATUTES
A. Federal and State Constitutional Amendments
One reason cited for judicial abstention in the sex discrimination area is
deference to the action of state legislatures on the Equal Rights Amend-
ment.15 3 However, whether the amendment will pass is uncertain. Ratifica-
tion of the proposal has slowed, with four states still needed for passage
and only one approval as against eleven rejections in the first six months
of 1975.154 To wait for the political process is not the complete solution to
existing sex discrimination issues.
Some states, unwilling to wait for the federal Equal Rights Amendment,
have enacted state equal rights amendments. Illinois, for example, amended
its constitution to bar specifically the denial of equal protection on the basis
of sex.15 5 In light of the amendment, the courts now view sex as a suspect
classification which must withstand strict judicial scrutiny. 56 Pennsylvania
has a similar equal rights provision, 157 which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has invoked in striking down a presumption of ownership of house-
hold goods in favor of the husband,'5 8 but the exact test which will be ap-
plied to future cases in Pennsylvania remains to be settled. 5 9 Apart from the
work-related losses. See Boyd, The Economic and Legal Basis of Compulsory In-
dustrial Insurance for Workmen, Part 1, 10 MICH. L. REV. 345, 354-58, 368-69 (1912).
In effect, the sex-based classifications in compensation statutes frustrate this underly-
ing policy of substituting one type of claim for another by failing to provide a
replacement for a wrongful death action for the lost wages of the female employee.
153 See H.R.J. Res. No. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
154 25 NAT'L VOTER No. 2, at 16-17 (1975). As of July 1975, only South Dakota
ratified, bringing the total to thirty-four states. Thirty-eight states are required to
ratify before 1979 for passage. See N.Y. Times, April 17, 1975, at 41, col. 1.
155 ILL. ANN. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (1971). The amendment reads:
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on
account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school
districts.
15G See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974) (holding un-
constitutional a penal law which treated seventeen-year-old males as adults while
processing seventeen-year-old females as juveniles); People v. Boyer, 24 I11. App. 3d
671, 321 N.E.2d 312 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a statute which made incest
between father and daughter a more serious offense than incest between mother
and son). Although Holiday Inns was decided six months after the Illinois electorate
ratified the state equal rights provision, the Illinois Supreme Court failed to discuss
the new amendment's bearing on the presumption of dependence issue. See Witwer,
Introduction to ILL. ANN. CONST. art. I (Smith-Hurd 1971).
157 PA. STAT. ANN. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (Supp. 1975). The section reads: "Equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual."
158 DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, - Pa. -, 331 A.2d 174 (1975).
159 See Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsyl-
vania, 77 DICK. L. REV. 254 (1973). But see Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d
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difficulties in interpreting the new state amendments, the impediments to
proposing and passing such amendments are still substantial, 60 and such
provisions do not therefore offer adequate assistance in the area of sex-
based discrimination in workers' compensation laws.
B. Statutory Amendments
Legislatures have recently been active in amending sex-biased compen-
sation provisions. In the last three years, eleven jurisdictions have changed
discriminatory statutes into sex-neutral laws.' 6 ' In each instance the legis-
lature chose to extend the widows' presumption to the widowers rather than
to eliminate the presumption for either sex and force both husband and
wife to show dependency in fact. 162 While this movement toward reform
is significant, legislative efforts have shortcomings. 163 Some lawmakers
324 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletics Ass'n,
334 A.2d 839 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1975) (bylaw forbidding girls from competing
with boys in athletic contests was unconstitutional on its face under the state equal
rights amendment).
160 A major setback in the equal rights movement occurred when, on November 4,
1975, the voters of both New York and New Jersey defeated proposed state equal
rights amendments. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1975, at 1, col. 8. In New York the effort
to place the provision on the ballot had encountered considerable opposition. N.Y.
Times, May 1, 1975, at 45, col. 1.
In addition, legislatures are not always consistent in their policies and actions. For
example, while Texas has a state equal rights provision (TEx. ANN. CONST. art. I,
§ 3(a) (1974)), the legislature has considered rescinding its ratification of the federal
amendment. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1975, at 41, col. 1.
161 Act of Sept. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-416, §§ I(e), 16(a), 88 Stat. 1144, 1147
(codified at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8101, 8133 (Supp. 1975) (Federal Employees' Compensa-
tion Act)); Act of Sept. 17, 1973, Act No. 1062, § 15, [1973] Ala. Laws 1763 (codified
at ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 280 (Cum. Supp. 1973)); Ch. 127, § 88, [1974] Alaska Laws-
(codified at ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.215 (Cum. Supp. 1974)); Ch. 133, § 27, [1973] Ariz.
Laws 943 (codified at ARIz. STAT. ANN. § 23-1046 (Supp. 1975); Ch. 454, § 14,
[1974] Del. Laws-(codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2330 (Supp. 1974)); Ch. 74-
197, § 11, [1974] Fla. Laws 549 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.16 (Supp. 1974));
Ch. 386, § 60, [1974] Ky. Acts 780 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.075
(Supp. 1975)); Ch. 47, § 1, [1973] N.M. Laws 169 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-10-12.10 (1974)); Ch. 401, [1973] Va. Laws-(codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 65.1-66 (Supp. 1975)).
162See statutes cited in note 161 supra. Either type of change would result in a
sex-neutral statute. The advantage of extending the presumption to both sexes is
that the compensation system becomes more efficient: more premium dollars are
paid out in benefits and fewer dollars are wasted on hearing, litigation, and other
administrative costs involved in proving dependency in fact.
163 In the equal protection area, legislative action frequently complements judicial
initiative. By the time that Reed reached the high court, Idaho had adopted the
Uniform Probate Code, which bears no sex preference in the selection of estate
administrators. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 & n.4 (1971). See also Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 523 n.2 (1975); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
416-17 (1920); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp 854 (D.R.I. 1973). Before the Court decided Fron-
tiero, Congress was considering amendments to the quarters allowance and medical
benefits provisions challenged there. Brief for Appellee at 12, 13. Unfortunately,
Congress failed to carry through its intention even after the Court's action. When
Frontiero held both the quarters allowance presumption (37 U.S.C. § 401) and the
medical benefits presumption (10 U.S.C. § 1072) unconstitutional, Congress promptly
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recognize the need for change but fail to institute accurate and effective
amendments. 64 California evidently felt pressure for change but opted for
only cosmetic alteration. The term "workmen's compensation" is now to be
known as "workers' compensation,"'1 65 but the bias in the presumption of
dependency remains.' 66 Likewise, the Council of State Governments has
assembled a model compensation code for legislative reform with no reform
of sex-biased presumptions. 16 7 Legislative action alone is insufficient, and
the responsibility for examining the alleged bias of sex-based classifications
must remain in the courts. 168
V. CONCLUSION
The presumptions underlying sex-biased workers' compensation death
benefits provisions are no longer in line with social and economic reality.
Twenty-five statutes to some degree discriminate against working women,
who comprise an increasing part of the labor force, and against their fam-
ilies. The impetus for reform of these statutes must come from the courts;
the process of legislative and constitutional change has proven too cumber-
some and uncertain for the task. Ample precedents for judicial intervention
exist.
-A. Russell Localio*
amended the quarters allowance statute by deleting the requirement of support of
the husband of a servicewoman. Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-64, Title I,
§ 103(2), 87 Stat. 148. Nothing was changed, however, on the medical benefits pro-
vision; it still contains the unconstitutional proof requirements. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1072
(1975).
164 For example, the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Act was amended so
that, as the statute now reads, death benefits for the husband of a deceased female
employee are payable only throughout "dependent widowerhood." 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 909(b) (Supp. 1975). Illinois experienced a halting amendment process which in-
volved an inartfully amended death benefit provision in 1973 and finally a compre-
hensive revision in 1975. See ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE §§ 8.1, 8.5 (1975).
165 CAL. LABOR CODE § 3200 (West Supp. 1975).
166 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
167 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION LAW §§ 2(t)
(1), (2) (1974).
168 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
* J.D., 1975, University of Michigan.
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